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ABSTRACT
We discuss the traditional criterion for discovery of requiring a significance cor-
responding to 5σ; and whether a more nuanced criterion might be better.
1 Introduction
It has become the convention in Particle Physics that in order to claim a dis-
covery of some form of New Physics, the chance of just the background having
a statistical fluctuation at least as large as the observed effect is equivalent to
the area beyond 5σ in one tail of a normalised Gaussian distribution, or smaller;
i.e. the p-value is no larger than 3 × 10−7. Indeed, journals are very reluctant
to allow the word ‘discovery’ to appear in the title, abstract or conclusions of a
paper, unless the p-value is that small. In this short note, we list the arguments
for and against this attitude.
2 Why 5σ?
Statisticians who hear about the 5σ criterion are very skeptical about it being
sensible. In particular, they claim that it is very uncommon that statistical
probability distributions accurately describe reality so far out in the tails. Par-
ticle Physics does differ from other fields in that we do believe that in many
situations the numbers of observed events do follow a Poisson distribution, and
so small tail probabilities may well be meaningful. However, certainly as far as
systematic effects are concerned, even in Particle Physics there is often a degree
of subjectivity in specifying the exact magnitude of the effect, let alone believing
in its assumed distribution far into the tails of the observed effect. Thus the
Statisticians’ criticism may well be valid.
The traditional arguments for the 5σ criterion are:
• History:
In the past there have been many ‘phenomena’ that corresponded to 3 or
4σ effects that have gone away when more data were collected. The 5σ
criterion is designed to reduce the number of such false claims. However,
it may well be worth checking whether the fraction of false claims at the
5σ level is indeed smaller than at 4σ.
• Look Elsewhere Effect (LEE):
The significance of an interesting peak in a mass spectrum is defined in
terms of the probability of a background fluctuation producing an effect
at least as large as the one actually seen. If the background fluctuation
is required to be at the observed mass, this probability is called the local
p-value. If, however, the restriction on the location of the background
fluctuation is removed, this is instead the global p-value, and is larger
than the local one because of the LEE.
Ambiguity in the global p-value arises because of the choice of require-
ments that are imposed on the location1 of the background fluctuation.
Possibilities include (a) any reasonable mass; (b) anywhere in the current
analysis; (c) anywhere in analyses by members of the experimental Col-
laboration; etc. In addition to the local p-value, it is desirable to quote at
least the global one corresponding to option (a). It is clearly important
to decide in advance of the analysis what procedure will be used; and to
specify in any publication exactly how the global p-values are defined.
• Subconscious Bayes’ Factor:
When searching for a discovery, the data statistic that is used to dis-
criminate between just background (known as the null hypthesis H0) and
‘background plus signal’ (H1) is often the likelihood ratio L1/L0 for the
two hypotheses; and the 5σ criterion is applied to the observed value
of this ratio, as compared with its expected distribution assuming just
background. However, more relevant to the discovery claim is the ratio of
probabilities for the two hypotheses. These are related by Bayes Theorem:
P (H1|data)
P (H0|data)
=
p(data|H1)
p(data|H0)
×
pi1
pi0
(1)
where p(data|Hi) and pii are respectively the likelihood and the prior prob-
ability for hypothesis Hi; and P (H1|data) is the hypothesis’ posterior
probability. So the ratio of probabilities we assign to the hypotheses is
their likelihood ratio times their prior probability ratio. Hence, in this
approach, even if the likelihood ratio favours H1, we would still prefer
H0 if our prior belief in H1 was very low. An example would be that, in
order to claim that we had discovered energy non-conservation in proton-
proton collisions at the LHC, we would require extremely strong evidence
from the data because our prior belief in energy non-conservation is very
low. Similarly, if an experiment seemed to show that neutrinos travel
faster than light, we might well have a tendency to believe that there was
1If the width and/or shape of the possible signal are regarded as free parameters, they also
contribute to the LEE factor.
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some undiscovered systematic, rather than that neutrinos were a potential
source for violating causality.
The above argument is clearly a Bayesian application of Bayes Theorem,
while analyses in Particle Physics usually have a more frequentist flavour.
Nevertheless, this type of reasoning does and should play a role in requir-
ing a high standard of evidence before we reject well-established theories.
There is sense to the oft-quoted maxim ‘Extraordinary claims require ex-
traordinary evidence’.
• Systematics:
It is in general more difficult to estimate systematic uncertainties than
statistical ones. Thus a nσ effect in an analysis where the statistical
errors are dominant may be more convincing that one where the nσ claim
is dominated by systematics errors. Thus in the latter case, a 5σ claim
should be reduced to merely 2.5σ if the systematic uncertainties had been
underestimated by a factor of 2; this corresponds to the p-value increasing
from 3× 10−7 by a dramatic factor of 2× 104. The current 5σ criterion is
partially motivated by a cautious approach to somewhat vague estimates
of systematic uncertainties.
Bob Cousins has recommended that for systematic-dominated analyses, it
is desirable to assess by how much the systematics must be increased in
order to reduce a significance above 5σ to that level; and then deciding
whether this level of systematic effect is plausible or not.
3 Why not 5σ?
There are several reasons why it is not sensible to use a uniform criterion of
5σ for all searches for new physics. These include most of the features that we
included as supporting the use of the 5σ criterion.
3.1 LEE
This can vary enormously from search to search. Some experiments are specif-
ically designed to measure one parameter, which is sensitive to new physics,
while others use general purpose detectors which can produce a whole range of
potentially interesting results, and hence have a larger danger of a statistical
fluctuation somewhere in the background. An example of an experiment with
an enormous LEE is the search for gravitational waves; these can have a variety
of different signatures, occur at any time and with a wide range of frequencies,
durations, etc.
It is illogical to penalise a single-measurement analysis simply because others
have a significant LEE.
3
Search Degree of Impact LEE Systematics Number
surprise of σ
Higgs search Medium Very high Mass Medium 5
Single top No Low No No 3
SUSY Yes Very high Very large Yes 7
Bs oscillations Medium/low Medium ∆m No 4
Neutrino oscillations Medium High sin2(2θ),∆m2 No 4
Bs → µµ No Low/Medium No Medium 3
Pentaquark Yes High/very high M, decay mode Medium 7
(g − 2)µ anomaly Yes High No Yes 4
H spin 6= 0 Yes High No Medium 5
4th generation q, l, ν Yes High M, mode No 6
vν > c Enormous Enormous No Yes >8
Dark matter (direct) Medium High Medium Yes 5
Dark energy Yes Very high Strength Yes 5
Grav waves No High Enormous Yes 7
Table 1: Summary of some searches for new phenomena, with suggested nu-
merical values for the number of σ that might be appropriate for claiming a
discovery.
3.2 Subconscious Bayes’ Factor
Some experiments search for effects which may be very weak but which are
predicted to occur in the Standard Model (S.M.), while others may be very
speculative (e.g. neutrinos travelling faster than the speed of light; search for
mini-Black Holes at the LHC;.....). Clearly, it is unreasonable to to require the
same level of significance for both types of search.
3.3 Systematics
Some experiments are very sensitive to systematics, while in others it plays a
minor role. Thus attempts to discover substructure of quarks by looking at
dijet events produced in quark-quark scattering at high enegy hadron colliders
are dependendent on the parton distribution functions (pdf’s) for the initial
state beam hadrons. An over-optimistic estimate of the accuracy of pdf’s in
the relevant kinematic region can then result in a significant-looking signature
of quark substructure, but which would be much less significant when more
realistic pdf uncertainties are allowed for.
It is far better to have a procedure which allows in some way for uncertain
systematics than to raise the significance level for all experiments as a way of
coping with this.
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3.4 Summary of some experimental searches
Table 1 provides a summary of some experimental searches for new physics.
The topics listed all correspond to searches that have actually been performed;
some of these have resulted in actual discoveries, others have made claims which
have subsequently been withdrawn, while others have set limits on the sought-
for effect. The remarks in the Table, however, are not related to any specific
experiment, but are supposed to be more generic. The final column contains a
set of suggestions for the significance level required, after making some attempt
to correct for the LEE, before a discovery could be claimed. The spirit of these
numbers is to provoke discussion of this issue (rather than being a rigid set
of rules), by suggesting a graded set of significance levels for different types of
experiments.
We briefly contrast the various effects that are important for some of the
searches in Table 1:
• (g − 2)µ:
This experiment, designed to measure the anomolous magnetic moment
of the muon, basically determines just this quantity, and so there is es-
sentially no LEE. Almost by definition, if there is no physics beyond the
S.M., the experimental value should agree with the S.M. prediction, so
any significant deviation would be an indication of new physics.
• Single top:
The top quark was discovered in tt¯ pair production in proton-antiproton
collisions at the Tevatron. The S.M. also predicts a somewhat smaller
production rate for single top-quark production. This was searched for,
and also found. Since the mass of the top quark was known from the
pair-production discovery mode, there was no LEE due to unknown mass
here. Also, the Subconscious Bayes Factor here actually favours single
top production, since it is predicted by the S.M., and indeed it would be
very surprising if it were not produced or was highly surpressed. Thus
this seems to be a good case where 5σ should not have been a requirement
before confimation of this production mode was accepted.
• Higgs boson:
Even before the discovery of a Higgs boson at CERN’s LHC, it was widely
expected to exist (although it would not have been completely a surprise
if it did not). Thus a discovery claim was not a surprise, but because of
its very important role in giving mass to the other elementary particles,
its impact was large. The LEE was due to the unpredicted Higgs mass,
but there were no further factors from the various possible decay modes,
whose branching ratios were predicted by the S.M.
• Supersymmetry (SUSY):
It would have been very satisfying if SUSY had reduced the number of
fundamental particles by pairing each known fermion with a known boson.
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This did not happen, and so SUSY has essentially doubled the number of
basic particles, by hypothesising SUSY partners for each known particle.
Thus there are many different types of SUSY particles to search for and
so, combined with a variety of possible mases and decay modes, there is
a large SUSY LEE factor. Combined with the high impact of discovering
a whole new sector of fundamental particles, the level of significance for a
SUSY discovery claim should be high.
• Mini-black holes:
There have been suggestions that mini-Black Holes could perhaps be pro-
duced in the high energy proton-proton collisions at the LHC. These are
highly speculative particles, with a large LEE factor arising from their
unknown mass and decay modes. A high standard of significance should
be required for a claim of their discovery.
3.5 Jeffreys-Lindley Paradox
A criticism of a fixed level of p-value for discovery comes from the Jeffreys-
Lindley (J-L) paradox[1]. Basically, this draws attention to the way a fixed
significance level for discovery does not cope with a situation where the amount
of data is increasing. An example involves testing a simple hypothesis H0 (e.g.
a Gaussian centred at µ = 0) against a composite one (e.g. µ > 0). It turns out
that for a wide variety of priors for µ, the Bayesian posterior probabilities for
the hypotheses can favour H0, while the frequentist p0-value can reject H0.
A simplified version of this effect is illustrated in Table 2; this uses simple
hypotheses for both H0 and H1, and does not require priors. This example
involves a counting experiment where in the first run 10 events are observed,
when the null hypothesis H0 predicts 1.0 and the alternative H1 predicts 10.0;
both the p-value for the null hypotheses (p0) and the likelihood ratio disfavour
H0. Then the running time is increased by a factor of 10, so that the expected
numbers according to H0 and H1 both increase by a factor of 10, to 10.0 and
100.0 respectively. With 31 observed events, p0 corresponds to about 5σ as in
the first run; but despite this the likelihood ratio now strongly favours H0. This
is simply because the 5σ nobs = 10 in the first run was exactly the expected
value for H1, but with much more data the 5σ nobs = 31 is way below the H1
expectation. This example thus shows that for a fixed p-value such as 3× 10−7
the likelihood-ratio can favour either hypothesis.
The conclusion from the J-L paradox is that the p0 cut used to reject H0
should decrease with increasing amount of data. However, there appears to be
no obvious way of implementing this, and Particle Physics tends to use fixed
levels of cuts, independent of the data size.
A discussion of the J-L Paradox in its application to Particle Physics will be
found in ref. [2].
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First data set Second data set
H0 Poisson, µ = 1.0 Poisson, µ = 10.0
H1 Poisson, µ = 10.0 Poisson, µ = 100.0
nobs 10 31
p0 1.1× 10
−7 0.8× 10−7
5.2σ 5.3σ
L0/L1 8× 10
−7 1.2× 10+8
Strongly favours H1 Strongly favours H0
Table 2: Comparing p-values and likelihood ratios
4 Conclusions
It would be very useful if we could distance ourselves from the attitude of
‘Require 5σ for all discovery claims’. This is far too blunt a tool for dealing
with issues such as the Look Elsewhere Effect, the plausibility of the searched-
for effect, the role of systematics, etc., which vary so much from experiment
to experiment. The problem is to produce an agreed alternative. Table 1 is
an attempt to stimulate discussion about a graded set of significance levels for
different types of experiments.
A possibility would be to replace the significance hurdle, which results in
a binary output2, by simply quoting the observed local and where relevant
global p-values. This would make the distinction between 4.9σ and 5.0σ much
less crucial, and it would also show up the difference between 5.0σ and 8.0σ.
Unfortunately, however, this may not be acceptable, as the general feeling may
well be to maintain emphasis on a fixed criterion to answer the question ‘Is this
a discovery or not?’
I wish to thank members of the Statistics Committes of the CMS and CDF
Collaborations (especially Bob Cousins and Tom Junk respectively) for enlight-
ening and useful discussions on this and many other statistical issues; and my
colleagues on these experiments for asking many thought-provoking questions.
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